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Chapter 3 
Youth Activism, Art and Transitional Justice: Emerging Spaces of Memory after the Jasmine 
Revolution 
By Arnaud Kurze 
 
On 14 January 2015, four years after the youth-propelled ouster of President Zine El Abdine Ben 
Ali, the festivities to celebrate the anniversary of a new era in Tunisian society remained limited. 
While conducting fieldwork on Bourguiba Avenue in the city center that day, the author felt that 
public spaces were much less crowded than compared to the time of the uprising when the 
protesters flooded the streets of Tunis. Moreover, newly elected president, Beji Caīd Essebsi, set 
a controversial tone during his commemorative speech at the presidential palace in Carthage. 
Rather than referring to all victims of the revolution, he only honored high-profile martyrs, 
fueling protests by victims’ families.1 Tunisia’s transition process, and in particular the efforts of 
dealing with the past, is in turmoil. While youth should feature in the center of all this, they have 
been sidelined and are marginalized from the political participation process. This chapter 
critically examines youth efforts to shape alternative transitional justice practices under the post-
authoritarian regime. 
The median age of Tunisia’s population is 31 years.2 While the statistical data indicates 
that society is composed of a vast young generation of citizens, the country is led by old elites, 
often passed their eighties. This in turn, creates a generational disconnect. The chapter draws on 
a concept of youth that goes beyond the legal notion of adulthood that defines youth as minors 
below a certain age.3 Instead, the study embraces a more cultural-inspired model that describes 
youth as an experience that shapes the individual’s level of dependency. As a result, the level of 
dependency is often contingent on economic factors and emotional ties to the youth’s family.4 
Focusing on a wide-range of youth actors in their twenties and thirties, the chapter analyzes the 
emergence of transitional justice practices that occur in parallel to the official steps put in place. 
In particular, it discusses the role of art and the impact of social movements to address human 
rights abuses. Several chapters in this book (see in particular Part II) focus on bottom up 
approaches in transitional justice processes. Reminiscent of Philipp Schulz and Caterina 
Bonora’s work, the author of this chapter zooms in on actors and issues that have found less 
scholarly attention. Based on different categories of art, it scrutinizes the work of youth activists 
and artists to deal with the past and fuel change in contemporary Tunisian society.  
This study centers around two essential questions in Tunisia’s transition process. On the 
one hand, it seeks to answer why political actors failed to integrate the harbingers of the 
revolution into a more holistic post-authoritarian accountability and memory process? On the 
other hand, its seeks to shed light on why the strong voice of protesters several years after the 
revolution went silent, leaving behind a heterogeneous landscape of activists and projects? This 
research maps different types of activities to illustrate how during this process, art served as a 
medium to create innovative spaces of deliberation. It draws on Foucault’s concept of 
heterotopia – spaces of otherness that are simultaneously physical and mental – to present new 
findings on the difficulties connected to generating spaces of memory and accountability. It 
relies on over two-dozen in-depth narrative interviews with local actors and content analysis of 
art campaigns and collective action. The author argues that the creation of this new fragile 
spatiality is challenged by a number of factors, including narratives and memories of Tunisia’s 
secularist and Islamist traditions. To elaborate on this argument, the chapter first explains the 
relationship between spaces, heterotopia and transitional justice. It is followed by a description 
of the research methodology. Then, it retraces the politicized transitional justice process that led 
to elite-driven results. Third, the study maps the role of youth activism and the use of art in order 
to illustrate that in spite of the creation of alternative spaces of memory challenges persist. It 
concludes by pointing to future avenues of research. 
 
Emerging Spaces, Heterotopia and Transitional Justice 
 
The notion of space in relation with power structures in society has found extensive academic 
attention notably in sociology as well as post-structuralist and post-modern literature.5 While the 
concept of space in transitional justice is essential, it has been understudied in the field compared 
to other disciplines6 As pointed out by the editors in the introduction of this volume, space can be 
defined in more than one way, including a physical, virtual and conceptual dimension, which are 
key to understanding the emergence of new rules and norms put forward by different social 
actors in post-conflict and post-authoritarian contexts. As a case in point, the control of an 
interim government over the implementation of local transitional justice practices in a post-war 
society, leads to an increase in state power over local population. Drawing on the case of post-
genocide Rwanda, Anuradha Chakravarty demonstrates “how the higher authorities ceded space 
and acquired control at the grassroots” and how the “gacaca courts provide insight into a 
repressive system that relied heavily on forms of social complicity and the self-interested support 
of its citizens.”7 By putting in place regulations and practices at the local level, authorities were 
able to define the post-conflict justice space particularly in geographically remote areas and 
consolidate state power during the transition process. Juxtaposing geography, knowledge and 
power is therefore particularly compelling when examining post-revolutionary Tunisia or other 
contexts in which alternative spaces and actors emerge during transitional justice processes, such 
as Philipp Schulz’s contribution on dealing with male sexual violence in post-conflict Uganda in 
this volume.8 The key hereto lies in exploring the power struggle between different stakeholders 
by analyzing the relationship between place and being. Focusing on a physical location, allows to 
assess broader sociopolitical and philosophical impacts on society.9 In transitional justice studies, 
various authors have also employed the concept to address a number of questions in different 
settings associated with the difficulties of dealing with the past. For instance, the notions of 
public space and victims’ voices are frequent reoccurring tropes in the literature. Based on a 
gender perspective, some authors describe the relentless efforts of civil society to create a public 
space for victims groups “to tell their truths and be heard by their fellow citizens and the state 
and to lay the groundwork for a paradigmatic case of sexual violence as a weapon of war to be 
presented for prosecution in the Guatemalan courts.”10 Their case exemplifies the empowerment 
of a voiceless group not only by creating a platform within society to enhance their visibility, but 
also by connecting it to a ulterior goal of paving the road to demand accountability by means of 
judicial trials. Similar mobilizations are also noticeable in post-Ben-Ali Tunisia, where families 
of the victims and martyrs of the revolution advocate justice. The gender initiative by the 
International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) is an excellent example that underlines the 
efforts of creating a voice for marginalized groups within society.11  
Although this type of protest and political struggle opposes different social actors—such as the 
ruling elites and those who suffered injustice—it also questions the institutions in place that deal 
with accountability matters, particularly their functioning, their objectives and their overall 
impact. As Tazreena Sajjad has demonstrated, major pitfalls include weak governance, 
deprioritization of the rule law, burdensome multidimensional coordination and the issue of 
institutional trust and popularity with the local population.12 She argues that these obstacles fuel 
critical debates around these contentious spaces that are continuously renegotiated by those 
involved. “Rather than disengaging from the question of accountability, the focus should be on 
how to enhance the capacity and the resources of such institutions so that they can negotiate 
these narrow spaces even more effectively.”13 	
Defining the role and character of a space that is negotiated by key players who 
participate in these processes is a common phenomenon in times of transition. German efforts to 
cope with atrocities committed under the Nazi regime are a case in point of a long and 
contentious process. The Holocaust discussion was revived in recent years with a debate on how 
much space—physically and ideologically—society should accord to other Nazi victims, such as 
those persecuted due to their sexual orientation.14 The act of commemorating and erecting 
memorials then becomes a matter of narrating a particular part of history, and promoting a 
specific victim identity. As Christiane Wilke’s demonstrates in her study, these 
compartmentalized collective memory efforts fail to capture the inherent moral complexity. The 
intricacies of overlapping identities, such as lesbian Jews who fell victim to their Nazi 
perpetrators, are ignored.15 The politicization of these different identities is poised to affect the 
perception of the imaginary and the physical space. Whereas the debate in Germany’s capital 
Berlin opposed the Lesbian, Gay, Transgender and Bisexual community and representatives of 
the Jewish community – particularly Holocaust survivors—it wasn’t fueled by political elites. In 
Morocco, in contrast, the current ruler, King Mohamed VI, used his influence to create a space 
that allows for dealing with the past. Yet, this process was carefully orchestrated to maintain his 
reign and power.16 Rather than constituting an opportunity to address past wrongdoings, the 
creation of an Equity and Reconciliation Commission served the sole purpose to point fingers at 
the abuses committed under his father’s regime, King Hassan II, while at the same time putting 
his current style of governance in a better light. The continuing immunity and the lack of 
accountability of former perpetrators further underline the politically motivated creation of a 
“safe space.” The King therefore seemed “to intend this space for stable change guided by one 
side only (the monarchy) rather than for constructive dialogue.”17 	
The current mandate of the Tunisian Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC) based on a 
transitional justice law passed in December 2013, during Ennahda’s final rule, cast similar 
doubts on its effectiveness and one might question to which extent the politicized process might 
backfire, hampering Tunisia’s young and fragile democratic transition. In addition, as will be 
discussed later, youth, the catalysts of Ben Ali’s fall, have little political voice in the current 
transition process, raising the question of their role, and the development of formal and informal 
settings that would allow for an inclusive participation of these actors. In order to explore the 
creation of alternative spaces in the post-Ben-Ali era, this chapter draws on Foucault’s notion of 
heterotopia, spaces of otherness. Foucault juxtaposes them to utopias, which are imaginary and 
do not exist as a real place. In contrast to utopias, so Foucault,  
 
There are also, probably in every culture, in every civilization, real places – places that do 
exist and that are formed in the very founding of society – which are something like 
counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real 
sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and 
inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to 
indicate their location in reality. Because these places are absolutely different from all the 
sites that they reflect and speak about, I shall call them, by way of contrast to utopias, 
heterotopias. 18 
 
Foucault’s unfinished work on heterotopias provides an excellent starting point to examine the 
creation and appropriation of post-revolutionary space by Tunisian youth.19  
The seizure of the political vacuum by established political elites, who quickly took over 
power after the fall of President Ben Ali to end turmoil and assure a peaceful transition deprived 
young protesters from any meaningful participatory space. Contentious politics that had led to 
political gains achieved through mass mobilization vanished in front of the eyes of activists and 
advocacy groups. The spaces that were left for many of them to voice their ideas, hopes and 
frustrations was limited to a virtual world, a utopia of sort, “sites with no real place.”20 Ironically, 
this space was created by Ben Ali’s regime embracing “education and the adoption of new 
technologies” to develop “an educated workforce that would attract further investment.” 21 While 
this goal was achieved, “it also had as a consequence the creation of many technologically savvy 
youth who would go on to use social media as a tool of political dissent and finally of political 
mobilization.” 22 Post-revolution attempts by institutions, such as the Temimi Foundation, to 
engage stakeholders, including politicians, economists, religious figures, scholars, lawyers, 
judges and activists, in an open dialogue failed to include youth in a sustainable, comprehensive 
transition process, in spite of the “civilized, responsible interaction, based on respect of divergent 
dissenting opinions.”23 Hence, the appropriation of alternative spaces became key in the battle to 
maintain a nascent political voice that emerged with the ouster of Ben Ali. It gave birth to the 
creation of post-revolution heterotopias, spaces of illusion that are neither here nor there, but that 
expose real spaces, while at the same time compensating for the lack of real space by creating 
spaces that are other. The lack of autonomy, in this case particularly political participation, also 
referred to as heteronomy in Kantian terms, raises questions with regards to sociopolitical 
transformations in society. According to Cornelius Castoriadis, social change involves radical 
discontinuities fueled by the social imaginary. The social imaginary, is based on a collective 
memory of each historical time period, capturing the social, cultural and political zeitgeist of the 
era.24 In the context of political exclusion in post-revolution Tunisia, these social actors have 
thus occupied imaginary spaces and conveyed meaning to these spaces of otherness, or in 
Castoriadis words, have initiated a process of “social imaginary signification.”25  
This trend raises a number of questions: Is it merely a mirror of current sociopolitical 
conditions, a “counter-site” as defined by Foucault, with the aim of resisting current the political 
struggle?26 Or do these efforts constitute more than just a form of resistance, creating an 
alternative space for a particular social group in Tunisian society, as posited by some scholars 
who further interpreted Foucault’s work, drawing on different cases studies.27 To answer these 
questions, it is important to deconstruct the notion of youth during and after Tunisia’s revolution 
that ousted President Ben Ali. A closer analysis of this transition period will help distinguish 
several categories of youth actors, illustrating the struggle to claim and appropriate these 
spaces.28 In addition, it reveals different forms of contestation that question the legitimacy of this 
newly created alternative spaces.  
 
Methodology 
This qualitative mixed methods study is based on field research conducted in Tunisia during 
summer 2014 and winter 2015. It draws on over two dozen of narrative interviews with youth 
actors, including activists, artists, and students. While most of the interviews were held in the 
capital Tunis, the subjects were from across the country, providing for a mix between urban and 
rural participants. Additional key stakeholders involved in the transition process have also been 
interviewed when deemed appropriate, including policy-makers, government experts, and 
practitioners. To select the research subjects, snowball sampling has been employed as a 
technique to reach out and tap into the network of different social groups that are hard to 
penetrated from outside. Oftentimes members of these groups form a closed-circle making it 
difficult for outsiders to gain access to the group and to obtain information.29 Snowball sampling 
therefore offers way of collecting data by which the researcher uses the first point of contact of 
the social group under scrutiny, in order to get introduced to additional members within the 
network for further interviews and in-person meetings that serve to gather complementary data. 
As a result, with each additional member, the circle expands, allowing for a wide-cast net of 
participants who lie within the research study parameters. The objective of these interviews is to 
collect information about the varied involvements and trajectories of youth actors at the time of 
the revolution and its aftermath, to capture different perceptions during the transition, and to 
compare a variety of views about conditions on the ground. Moreover, this work uses content 
analysis to complement the data collected through research interviews. Documents include news 
articles retrieved from the written press and from online sources, reports and official documents 
released by government institutions and nongovernmental organizations, as well as information 
gathered from online blogs and social media such as Twitter and Facebook. These diverse 
sources were in particular analyzed against the backdrop of discursive patterns indicating for 
instance counter-cultures or trends in public debates within Tunisian society and sub-cultures 
within the different youth categories.  
 
Tunisian Politics of Transition: Transitional Justice à la Carte 
To understand the role of youth in Tunisia’s post-Ben-Ali era, it is necessary to highlight the 
evolution of the public debate of transitional justice in the aftermath of the revolution. The 
implementation of accountability measures during the post-regime period was the product of a 
politicized process that led to elite-driven technocratic bargaining at the expense of youth 
involvement. As Aymen Briki, a researcher in political science and law at the University of 
Sousse, points out  
 
In spite of the large number of youth and students in the streets during the fall of 
President Ben Ali, political elites implementing policy strategies during the post-
revolutionary transition period did not actively include the ideas and suggestions of youth 
in the democratization process.30 
 
 This obstacle-filled process illustrates the political struggle associated with addressing grave 
human rights abuses, political repression and other forms of wrongdoings. Transition periods 
after a conflict or the collapse of an authoritarian regime raise a number of questions about 
dealing with the past, including discussions on purging, trials or reconciliation. Additionally, 
society is confronted with the problem of how to set the historical record straight. However, 
shedding light on these dark chapters of history is a process that is a biased process and a fact-
oriented analysis of past abuses can often turn into contested politics of justice.31  
Tunisia’s post-authoritarian transitional justice record fits this pattern. The post-Ben-Ali 
caretaker governments that succeeded the president’s ouster implemented piecemeal transitional 
justice measures, focusing mostly on addressing harms suffered by protesters during the weeks 
of the revolution. This à la carte choice of dealing with the past underlines the need for security 
and stability after the regime collapse pursued by the interim political establishment. Continuity 
rather than tabula rasa was at order. When the Islamist troika government – headed by Ennahda 
and joined by Ettakatol and Congress of the Republic – formed a government after the fall 2011 
elections, a broader vision emerged, leading to the creation of a Ministry of Human Rights and 
Transitional Justice, headed by Ennahda's Samir Dilou. Yet, as Anne Wolf points out, this also 
posed problems: 
 
many opposition parties and international organizations criticized the tying of transitional 
justice to the executive rather than an independent body, arguing that this could easily politicize 
the process – especially because Ennahda had suffered more than any other movement under Ben 
Ali.32 
 
After several crises in 2013, including the assassination of two politicians in the opposition33, the 
troika decided to hand over power to a technocratic caretaker government led by an independent, 
Mehdi Jooma. Before the power shift, however, the parliament passed a comprehensive, the so-
called transitional justice law, with the objective to deal with regime abuses of the past starting 
from 1 July 1955 until the issuance of this law on 24 December 2013. 34 Spanning over six 
decades of abuses, it systematically covers a myriad of measures, including accountability, 
reparations and reconciliation.35 In order to do so, the law included the creation of a Truth and 
Dignity Commission with the goal of investigating human rights violations during this period.36 
While this legislative achievement could open the doors for a holistic transitional justice 
approach in Tunisia in the near future, it nonetheless accentuates the clash between secularists 
and Islamists that is at the very core of this process. From a restorative justice perspective the law 
has great potential to address injustice from the past. This includes notably the early years of 
nation-state building, when Habib Bourguiba37, in an effort to consolidate his power, asked the 
French colonial military for help to quash the Yusufists, the Islamist opposition, leaving 
hundreds of their supporters dead.38 Although this reckoning with the past represents an 
opportunity to account for systematic repression of the Islamist opposition over several decades, 
it also poses a risk as politicization of the transitional justice process and the rising polarization 
of Tunisian politics loom large.39 
Moreover, this process led to a technocratic government approach of dealing with transitional 
justice matters that resulted in an exclusive, elite-driven process with insiders opposing outsiders. 
Already in spring 2012 the Ministry for Human Rights and Transitional Justice launched a 
national dialogue on transitional justice in coordination with the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the 
International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). Although the aim was to bring together key 
stakeholders in the process—Tunisian and international NGOs, international organizations and 
domestic and international policymakers—these meetings only included political elites, leaving 
grassroots organizations and youth excluded from the negotiations. Christopher Lamont and Hé 
La Boujneh describe the nature of the high politics as followed: 	
 
Illustrative of the extent to which Tunisia’s transitional elites sought to promote 
transitional justice was the fact that Tunisia’s three presidencies, as the President of the 
Republic Moncef Marzouki, the President of the National Constituent Assembly Mostafa 
Ban Jafaar and the Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali are known domestically, attended the 
event along with other governmental ministers.40 
 
Although grassroots efforts were not entirely ignored, the prevailing efforts are only limited in 
scope. In 2012, for instance, the ICTJ launched an initiative with the aim of empowering women 
in the transitional justice process, providing training to NGOs that work on women’s rights.41 
According to ICTJ staff working on these issues, however, efforts are slow and it is too early to 
gauge the impact at the moment.42 These initiatives are nonetheless an exception rather than the 
rule. Instead, the overall process continues to be technical and elusive. An invitation-only 
workshop held by Human Rights Watch (HRW), UNDP and the ICTJ on 12 January 2015 at the 
occasion of the launch of a HRW report on the Tunisia’s trials on the killings during the 
uprisings further illustrates this problem.43  
It was on a sunny Monday morning that a number of experts and Tunisian elites gathered 
at the Africa Hotel on Bourguiba Ave in the capital for an entire day to discuss the record of 
transitional justice in the country with a particular on the military trials between 2010 and 2011 
as well as the special chambers to account for past abuses as stipulated in the transitional justice 
law. While the moderator of the wrap-up session, Filippo di Carpegna, a Judicial Technical 
Advisor at UNDP, stressed the importance of including recommendations for future legislative 
propositions, it became evident from the start of the last session that the organizers were less 
interested in getting additional input from participants, but instead merely presented their own 
views to a select circle of Tunisian elite audience. Earlier that day, however, during a roundtable 
discussion on comparative case studies and lessons learned for the Truth and Dignity 
Commission, Mezri Haddad, a renowned Jewish-Tunisian intellectual, criticized this expert-
driven process:  
 
You were so kind as to provide us with your expert views. … Yet, the principal problem 
that remains is that despite an existing transitional justice process and a transitional 
justice law, there is a lack of political will. In fact, relevant stakeholders unwilling to 
apply these rules but instead are trying to sabotage or dissolve the commission.44 
 
Corinna Mullin and Ian Patel, who followed this process closely, refer to it as “hegemonic 
justice.”45 While this expert-centered approach discloses the different power structures within 
society with international actors actively shaping the outcome46, youth activists, many of who 
carried the brunt of the revolution, feel left out and have launched their own transitional agenda. 
Hé La Boujneh, for instance, an activist, emphasized her grassroots efforts to empower the 
young generation, “we have to build our own transitional justice movement, le Front pour la 
Justice Transitionelle, in order to render this process more inclusive.”47 Reactions like hers to the 
current situation stress the challenging conditions, in which youth grapple to define their role in 
the search for accountability in the post-Ben-Ali era. 
 
Mapping the Role of Youth Activism and the Use of Art  
In the following, the chapter maps out a variety of youth responses to the present conditions on 
the ground and explains to what extent these different groups were able to create an alternative 
space that allows them to confront past abuses in spite of the exclusive, official government-led 
transitional justice process. It draws from a selection of categorized examples that are analyzed 
against the backdrop of various art forms. Furthermore, it underlines the specific characteristics 
of each medium the different social groups are relying on. First, the chapter discusses the place 
of cyber activism during the transition period. Related to this, it examines several types of local 
street art and contrasts it to internationally sponsored projects. Attention is paid also to 
traditional art forms, such as visual arts and performing arts. In this context, the chapter also 
scrutinizes performance activism, which uses elements of the performing arts as a form of 
protest. Finally, the chapter completes this map by discussing recent developments of youth 
engagement in civil society organizations. The objective is not to provide a holistic picture of 
each space48; yet, to provide an initial topography of the different youth categories as well as the 
use of their available space for deliberative purposes. 
 
Cyber Activism and the Development of a “Leitkultur”49 
The use and particularly the potential of the Internet during the Tunisian uprisings after 17 
December 2010 and in the post-Ben-Ali period has been described as an “effective tool for 
supporting the capabilities of the democratic activists by allowing forums for free speech and 
political networking opportunities; providing a virtual space for assembly.”50 Social media, and 
in particular Facebook, was perceived as a crucial factor that sparked the Tunisian revolution.51 
In an interview, social media scholar and activist Kerim Bouzouita, underlined that while twitter 
served as an opinion shaper by a limited amount of users, over two million Tunisians52 have 
Facebook accounts and the exchange of information during the weeks of the uprisings on the site 
equaled that of over 150 million North American users during that period.53 But what exactly 
constitutes cyber activism and what role did the Internet and especially social media play during 
the political transition in Tunisia? Philip Howard put forward a frequently used definition, 
describing it as, 
 
the act of using the Internet to advance a political cause that is difficult to advance offline 
… the goal of such activism is often to create intellectually and emotionally compelling 
digital artifacts that tell stories of injustice, interpret history, and advocate for particular 
political outcomes.54 
 
An excellent example to illustrate this description is Sami Ben Gharbia and his colleagues. 
Gharbi is a Tunisian blogger, human rights activist and founder of Nawaat and was exiled in the 
Netherlands from 1998 until 2011. He created the organization with the goal of generating an 
online discussion platform for activists and dissidents in and from Tunisia. In a nutshell, the site 
aggregates articles and other online media for further dissemination across the web. During the 
upheavals in early 2011, Gharbia’s team posted videos originating on Facebook to Nawaat’s 
blog, from which other activists would then repost it on their pages and spread them through 
various online platforms. Other, more individualized expressions of dissidence include for 
instance changing profile pictures of individual headshots to representations of Tunisia, such as 
the national flag. But in order to underline the rupture with the old regime and demonstrate the 
belonging to a new, “imagined community”55 online, the flag had been tinkered with and the red 
background was painted black.56 Other examples of the flag included personifications with tears 
running from the white circle in the center of the banner and were part of forging an alternative 
citizenship and form of belonging, a so-called “Alter-Tunisianship” (in French “Alter-
Tunisienneté).”57 
There is a close link between ideas that spread in the virtual world and putting into 
practice different forms of protest or advocacy work, which will be developed further below. For 
now, however, the above examples illustrate that “activists have not only integrated the Internet 
into their repertoire but also … what counts as activism, what counts as community, collective 
identity, democratic space and political strategy.”58 In this context, Kerim Bouzouita described 
the online work of bloggers and activists as an effort to establish a “Kultur,” referencing the 
German term as a notion that refers to a process and its result, similar to agriculture as the art of 
sowing and cultivating plants. For him, the importance is to establish a culture promotes core 
values of modernity including democracy, secularism, human rights and civil society. This idea 
of a Leitkultur59, first mentioned by Tibi, Bassam, a Syrian-born German political scientist, is 
already visible through efforts that have spilled over from the net, such as the initiative 
OpenGovTN60 that aims at introducing new forms of democratic participation and citizenship 
into Tunisian society in order to move beyond the system of electoralism.  
This Leitkultur, however, remains contested in society from two specific fronts. On the 
one hand, the Tunisian state continues to fight against individual cases of activism, putting 
several cyber activists in prison during the transition period. More recently, authorities arrested a 
blogger, Yassine Ayari, and put him on a military trial for “defaming the army.” 61 While the 
virtual space has been successfully claimed by youth since the revolution and freedom of 
expression expanded exponentially compared to the Ben Ali years, a political power struggle 
remains visible with the territorial boundaries drawn in favor of a political elite used to a deep 
state watching over society. On the other hand, the marginalization of political Islam in Tunisia 
since the revolution particularly in the media has incited increasing dissident Islamist and 
Salafist voices online. While secularists are still given statewide access to media platforms, the 
latter have been excluded, which has fueled the use of the Internet as a counter-space to 
propagate their ideas and discourse.62 In parallel with their online contestation, Salafists also 
expanded their activism on the ground. Before discussing this issue in relation with performance 
activism; however, the author focuses on street art, a relatively recent form of cultural expression 
in Tunisia. 
 
Street Art as “Glocal Space” 
The contested online space is complemented by a physical space, consisting of streets, walls and 
buildings. The message is still composed of words and images, but the medium is paint and spray 
cans. Street art and graffiti developed into one of the major forms of expression during and after 
the fall of the Ben Ali regime. This section underlines a few examples of this trend in order to 
explain its role for transitional justice processes and the role of youth in them. By street art, the 
chapter refers to as “the act of writing upon walls (also known as parietal writing) is an equally 
ubiquitous and elemental act, one linked to the primal human desire to decorate, adorn, and 
physically shape the material environment.”63 But in the context of the Tunisian transition, the 
significance of street art goes further. In fact, graffiti here represents a communication device 
that serves the purpose of transmitting a message from a collective group to the state.64 It has 
become a major weapon in the local and urban territorial disputes confronting the state and 
youth. When the waves of protest descended over large part of the country and the military and 
police forces lost control over the crowds, many protestors armed with spray cans and paint 
started claiming public spaces, marking slogans, symbols and images on walls, buildings and 
onto the street.65 
Many slogans that adorned walls and even street signs were painted in two languages: 
Either in French and Arabic or in English and Arabic. The objective was to highlight the 
universal character of the publicly expressed messages. This was done against the backdrop of an 
internationalized transition with corps of journalists invading the country to report on the 
unfolding of the events. Hence, their work was not only visible to the local eye, but to an 
international audience as well. A variety of messages were embedded in the art created across 
these urban spaces, including beautiful, detailed murals as well as crude, hastily sprayed anti-
regime slogans on government buildings. The destruction of former regime property, such as one 
of the Ben Ali beach houses in Hammamet that was vandalized and covered in graffiti, attest of 
the angry appropriation of a space exclusively reserved to the ruling elites at the time.66 
Yet, the story of street art does not end here, as it has a more global and internationalized 
narrative to it as well. During the post-Ben-Ali period, a number of initiatives were developed, 
including international graffiti artists, who were invited to illustrate their skills in a recently freed 
society. In Djerba, for instance, the largest North African island off the Tunisian coast and a 
popular tourist destination, Tunisian-French artists, Mehdi Ben Cheikh, launched a project called 
“Djerbahood.” For this, artists from over two-dozen countries travelled to a little village, Erriadh, 
on the island between July and August 2014 to create murals and embellish the local landscape 
with their art.67  
A much more controversial project was launched in the March 2011, “Inside Out 
Tunisia” under the guidance of French photographer and artist JR.68 His work consists of 
oversized black-and-white photographic images that he posts in public spaces reminiscent of 
graffiti artist work. For this project, a team of photographers shot six hundred portraits of 
ordinary Tunisian, which were subsequently exposed in diverse public locations around the 
country.69 While the group of artists embarked on a journey to plaster random buildings and 
walls in remote regions of the country, the response was not always as welcoming as the artists 
initially hoped for. Several times, local residents attacked the art installations, ripping the paper 
off the walls. These walls contained portrait pictures of many average Tunisian citizens who had 
previously agreed to participate in the project so that photographers could take headshot pictures 
for the installations.70 Art—which often times is used as a medium of contestation but served 
here, in the eyes of the organizers, as a medium to provide a voice and space for communities to 
share their untold narratives in form of artwork—became a politically contested medium and the 
appropriation of physical space was rejected by the local population. 	
 
Visual Arts, Performing Arts and Performance Activism as Cultural Contestation 
In the visual and performing arts in Tunisia, the fall of Ben Ali fueled a spurt of creativity and an 
increase in artwork, illustrated by the growing number of art galleries in La Marsa, an upscale 
and tourist-flooded neighborhood in the capital.71 Unsurprisingly the prospects of commodifying 
revolutionary art, in particular the idea of copying the tropes of the initial street art, inspired artist 
to sell their graffiti-inspired work on a globalized market.72 Yet, such an exposure did not result 
in art losing its sting, as some have argued elsewhere.73 Rather, in Tunisia’s transitional context, 
this type of art played a vital role for the progressive and vanguard forces of the country. As 
Jacqueline Adams concisely put it in her work on women’s protest under Pinochet in Chile, the 
women used it “for framing, to attract resources, to communicate information about themselves, 
to foster useful emotions, and as a symbol.”74 But in fragmented and fragile societies, these 
forms of expression and belonging can provoke tensions, as the following example illustrates. 
The organization of the ninth “Printemps des Art,” an annual, internationally renowned art 
exhibit in Tunis, turned into a clash of cultures and traditions in 2012, when a group of Salafists 
entered the premises and destroyed some of the art installation and threatening several artists, 
claiming blasphemous nature of the paintings, thus forcing the exhibit to shut down.75  
In connection with a growing religious conservatism due to the Ennahda-led government 
between 2011-2013, performance activism has also provoked a conservative outcry in Tunisian 
society. Amina Sboui, a women’s rights activist, for instance, posted a top-less picture of herself 
on Facebook in the midst of the March 2013 protests in honor of the assassinated of Chokri 
Belaïd, an opposition leader. Her naked body contained the following message: “My body 
belongs to me and no one’s source of honor.”76 She was part of the feminist group FEMEN, a 
Paris-based organization that originated in Ukraine known for its topless protests and 
performance activism in public locations.77 While it wasn’t indecent exposure that caused her 
trouble with the law, she was eventually arrested later that spring in Kairouan, a conservative 
Bastion of the Salafist movement, while she tagged the word “FEMEN” on a wall nearby a 
Mosque.78 The juxtaposition of the virtual and physical space is further accentuated by the so-
called Harlem Shake incident. In spring 2013, Tunisian students posted a comedy sketch with a 
song by US DJ Bauuer, causing the video to go viral inspiring memes in schools and universities 
around the country.79 The secular youth’s motives behind the dissemination of the message is 
summarized by Mohamed-Salah Omri as follows, 
 
Harlem shakers claim to represent life by setting their dancing and colourful [sic] 
costumes against a culture they see as preaching death and darkness – a reference to 
black niqabs and gowns worn by followers of Salafism, and their trademark black banner. 
Many Salafis, in turn, accuse the youth of being immoral and slavish imitators of "trashy" 
Western culture. 80 
 
The Salafists movement’s response to this form of public ridicule was prompt, reverting to 
performances that included a strong political message. In fact, their actions accentuated the 
instrumentalization of identity and belonging to contest this imaginary space as well as to protect 
and expand their own space. In addition to reinforcing symbols, such as black banners, niqabs, 
long shirts and skullcaps – practices that had increased under the troika government – members 
of the movement staged a couple of highly mediatized events. They stormed two public locations 
and captured one of the most representative symbols of the Tunisian state: the national flag on 
top of each of the occupied buildings. They then replaced them with the Salafist black banner on 
Manouba University campus and the clock tower on Bourguiba Avenue in the capital.81 The 
boundaries between the imaginary and the real are thus intrinsically linked and the online space 
further fuels the contestation of the imagined spaces of each of the involved actors, including the 
state, secular as well as religious-oriented youth. The existing cleavages within society are 
therefore a political minefield putting ruling elites in front of a conundrum that requires them to 
elaborate an inclusive transition strategy to counterbalance increasing tensions.  
 
The Emerging but Fragile Role of Civil Society Organizations 
Civil society under Ben Ali’s regime had been silenced a few years after he came to power in 
1987, consolidating the strong state after an initial reform agenda.82 While during the past decade 
civil society started growing again in many Arab states, it was less because of an increase in 
power, but because of a resilience strategy of authoritarian rulers to remain in power.83 Several 
of the interviewed youth, representing Tunisia’s young society, remember the lack of political 
activism or engagement under Ben Ali’s regime, such as Najla Abbes: 
 
Tunisian youth are focused on their studies, on their careers, life with family and friends 
and their last concern was politics or even being part of it. ... It’s just how we lived [under 
Ben Ali’s regime].84 
 
Politics constituted a preexisting, unchangeable space that shouldn’t be interfered with, due to 
the fear of the president’s security apparatus. More importantly, however, Ben Ali created a 
leisure society in which youth gravitated around a coffee shop culture and sports, and thus 
“numbing their critical reason,” as Héla Ammar, a famous artist, activist and scholar pointed 
out.85 These conditions led to a “desertification of you youth” in the political space with visibly 
consequential results of politically disengaged youth in the post-Ben-Ali era. 86 
The fall of Ben Ali, however, has changed the civil society landscape with “activists and 
projects mushrooming everywhere,” underlines Nour Kaabi, a young activist working for the 
NGO Jamaity, an umbrella organization that coordinates activities with different nonprofits 
across the country.87 To the question about concrete outreach and the impact of grassroots work 
outside the state capital and the urban coastal regions, she responded that the change is only 
visible slowly, but incrementally.88 The objective of many of these movements in the aftermath 
of the revolution is less about institutional change, but reflects a goal pursued by many of the 
post-industrial movements of the 1980s and 1990s. Instead of advocating for changes in 
government policies, their activities aimed at shifting societal beliefs and practices among their 
members and beyond the membership circle. 89 The case of Charfeddine Yacoubin, one of the 
founders of the Tunisian Association of Public Comptrollers, epitomizes this trend. Disenchanted 
by the political imbroglio during Tunisia’s transition he decided to create a civil society 
organization to advocate for institutional change and promote basic democratic values.90 As a 
graduate from the Tunis National School of Administration, an institution that grooms Tunisia’s 
technocratic elites, and as a former member of the political party, Progressive Democratic Party, 
he chose to work in the nongovernmental sector instead of for the state.91 For several years, he 
has been spearheading reform efforts with the goal of fighting corruption, establishing more 
transparency within governmental institutions and of helping boost democratic processes in the 
country. Yet, Yacoubin remains very skeptical about the impact of civil society: “I am not one 
hundred percent convinced about the role of civil society because after working for over four 
years and fighting in the name of our association, there is still no significant reform.”92 He 
referred to the current endemic situation in Tunisian society as the “democratization of 
corruption.” 93 In other words, even at the smallest scale graft practices are common to either 
speed up administrative procedures or to make them possible in the first place. Change will only 
happen incrementally. And this is one of the lessons to take away from Tunisia’s process. While 
these different, overlapping spaces bring together particularly youth from different sociopolitical 
backgrounds, they remain fragile and contested. As long as the mainstream political process is 
reluctant to integrate a much larger share of Tunisia’s emerging civil society, the transitional 
justice process will continue to be elitist and the efforts put in place by NGO activists will 
remain disjointed spaces. 
 
Conclusion 
Drawing on the Foucauldian concept of heterotopia, this study analyzed the role of youth 
activism and the use of art in post-Ben-Ali Tunisia to assess the emergence of alternative 
memory spaces. It pursued a two-fold goal. First, it retraced the politicized transitional justice 
process in post-authoritarian Tunisia in order to answer the question of why the political 
establishment fell short to include youth—the driving force of the revolution—into the public 
discussion on how to account for regime abuses and how to deal with the past. Second, it 
mapped different forms of youth activism against the backdrop of art as a medium of 
deliberation to create an alter-space for transitional justice in Tunisia. Despite the successful 
emergence of these spaces, this process faces still many challenges, as illustrated by the several 
case studies in the different categories of activism and art that were discussed in this research. 
Future longitudinal studies as well as comparative case studies across the North Africa region 
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